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Executive Summary 
 
Imagine what the public reaction would be if a tsunami destroyed over 2,000 homes 
in one area, leaving 2,000 families without shelter or assets.  North Minneapolis is 
now experiencing such a tidal wave of foreclosures, and while the houses may still be 
standing, the devastation families experience through foreclosure is on the scale of 
that experienced in a massive natural disaster.  Northside neighborhoods and 
residents are concerned about the negative impacts on individuals, families and 
communities.  Individuals and families lose their homes, their credit ratings and 
potentially face interruptions in work and education.  They are often forced to leave 
communities in which they had developed and invested social capital in the form of 
relationships and trust.  Neighborhoods also lose social capital and remaining 
residents face the loss of home values, potential increases in crime and loss of jobs.  
Responding to this situation requires a comprehensive approach in order to address 
both the individual and community levels.  The response must include prevention of 
foreclosures as well as assistance to families and communities dealing with the 
aftermath of foreclosure. 
 
Our research shows that many of the fraudulent practices which led to the current 
crisis are being addressed by legislation and law enforcement.  We do believe that 
additional legislation can help reduce widespread fraud from recurring when the 
recent inflated market conditions return. 
 
We find no connection between murder and crime rates and the foreclosure crisis.  
While foreclosure may lead to vacancies and provide opportunities for vandalism, 
crime has been dropping in North Minneapolis.  The high murder rates of previous 
years occurred when there was no foreclosure crisis. 
 
We find that foreclosure not only forces individual households, both homeowners and 
tenants, out of their homes but also has the effect of reducing the overall level of 
home ownership in a neighborhood.  This research documents how foreclosures are 
accelerating the pace of conversion from owner-occupied to investor-owned 
properties in North Minneapolis.  While many foreclosed properties are already 
owned by investors, the percentage of these properties is increasing rapidly as 
mortgage companies repossess homes and are unable to quickly resell them to new 
homeowners. 
 
Proposals to Reduce Mortgage Fraud 
 
1) Pass legislation requiring that the public record include the names of the 
appraiser, the individual mortgage broker, the institution originating the 
mortgage and the title company involved in the transaction.  This will 
increase the transparency of transactions. 
 
Proposals to Reduce & Prevent Foreclosures in North Minneapolis 
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2) Increase public awareness of mortgage foreclosure prevention resources 
by involving NNA members and other local community organizations in 
conducting public education including door to door outreach and other 
grass-roots efforts. Support efforts to provide more resources for outreach 
by NNA organizations and others. 
3) Expand resources available for foreclosure prevention counseling on the 
North Side, including training multi-lingual staff able to serve Hmong, Lao 
and other immigrant communities. 
4) Ensure that Northside renters receive information about foreclosure and 
their rights to remain in their homes to help them avoid dislocation and 
homelessness.  This will also prevent vacant buildings from becoming 
targets of vandalism and arson and locations of criminal activity. 
5) Support efforts to coordinate housing services to North Minneapolis 
families and owners facing foreclosure including e.g. matching potential 
tenants with responsible landlords. 
6) Encourage mortgage holders to adopt a voluntary three month moratorium 
on foreclosures on the North Side to allow more time for working out new 
mortgage terms with eligible homeowners. 
 
Proposal to Preserve and Promote Home Ownership 
 
7) NNA should convene a group to develop a comprehensive housing and 
redevelopment policy for North Minneapolis to address the challenges and 
opportunities posed by the foreclosure crisis.  Discussion should include 
consideration of ways to promote community ownership and control of 
parcels and/or buildings, the benefits and disadvantages of increasing 
density, etc. 
8) After developing this housing policy, NNA should work with Northside 
Home Fund Board and other partners to carry it out. 
 
 
Adopting these policies will require coordination and action from the local to the 
state levels.  We look forward to working with all stakeholders, public officials and 
office holders to create solutions that assist the thousands in need and preserve 
our North Minneapolis neighborhoods. 
 
The research in this report was commissioned by the Northside Neighborhood 
Alliance, a group convened by NorthWay Community Trust to unite North 
Minneapolis neighborhood associations around common goals and actions. 
 
Northside Neighborhood Alliance Members 
• Cleveland Neighborhood Association http://www.clevelandneighborhood.org/  
• Harrison Neighborhood Association www.hnampls.org   
• Hawthorne Area Community Council www.hawthornecommunity.org   
• Jordan Area Community Council www.jordanmpls.org   
3                                                            
• Lind-Bohannon Neighborhood Association 
http://www.neighborhoodlink.com/minneapolis/l-bna/ or via www.camdenews.org  
• McKinley Neighborhood Association (access via www.camdenews.org ) 
• Northside Residents Redevelopment Corporation (representing Near North & 
Willard-Hay neighborhoods)  www.nrrc.org  
• Shingle Creek Neighborhood Association www.scna-mpls.org  
• Victory Neighborhood Association http://www.victoryneighborhood.org/  
 
 
 
This report was prepared by Alyssa Erickson and Allan Malkis.  Ms. Erickson is a 
graduate student in Geographic Information Science at the University of Minnesota.  
Mr. Malkis is the Research & Evaluation Program Manager for NorthWay Community 
Trust.   
 
 
An Advisory Committee assisted in the guidance of this work.  Members included: 
 
Anne McCandless  Jordan Area Community Council Housing Committee 
Jerry Moore   Jordan Area Community Council Executive Director 
Brandon Nessen  Minnesota ACORN Organizer 
Nelima Sitati   Harrison Neighborhood Association Organizer 
Jeff Skrenes   Hawthorne Area Community Council Housing Director 
Dorothy Titus   Jordan Area Community Council Housing Committee 
Georgianna Yantos  Hawthorne Area Community Council board 
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INTRODUCTION
 
North Minneapolis has historically had a high proportion of home owners1, a 
characteristic that contributes to stability and is considered desirable.  North 
Minneapolis also has had a very high proportion of African Americans who are home 
owners, compared to a very low rate for the city as a whole2.  NorthWay Community 
Trust and the Northside Neighborhood Alliance wish to see homeownership, an 
important opportunity for wealth accumulation, remain available to most Northside 
households. 
 
The recent tsunami of foreclosures has raised the concern that many homes 
previously occupied by their owners will now be owned by absentee landlords and 
investors.  The loss of homeowners in a community damages the social capital, 
breaking some of the social ties and relationships that make a neighborhood 
“neighborly” and support its residents.  It is also feared that some of the investors will 
be new to property ownership and may not have the financial resources or will to 
maintain the property, having counted on rising property values to allow them to 
make a quick profit through a resale now hard to arrange.  
 
The Northside Neighborhood Alliance, including representatives of most of North 
Minneapolis’ 13 neighborhoods, asked NorthWay Community Trust to conduct a 
research study of the impacts of fraudulent purchasing and absentee ownership on 
North Minneapolis.  Graduate student research support was provided through 
Neighborhood Participation for Community Revitalization (NPCR), a program of the 
Center for Urban & Regional Affairs (CURA) at University of Minnesota.  Allan Malkis, 
Research & Evaluation Program Manager at NorthWay Community Trust, supervised 
the project.  NNA members and other interested residents formed an Advisory 
Committee to help guide the work. 
 
The project involved three major phases.  First, a series of interviews was conducted 
with knowledgeable residents, elected officials and other experts in housing and 
foreclosure issues to outline the scope of the problem facing the neighborhoods3.  
Second, a data analysis was done to determine the extent to which foreclosures are 
contributing to the decline of home ownership on the Northside4.  Finally, policy 
options for dealing with the problem of foreclosures and the decline of home 
ownership were reviewed. 
 
                                                 
1 In 2000, 65% of North Minneapolis housing units were owner-occupied, compared to 49% for the remainder of 
the city.  Census 2000, SF1. 
2 North Minneapolis had a 49% owner occupancy rate for Black households, compared to 23% for the remainder 
of the city in 2000.  Census 2000, SF2 
3 See Appendix I, II and III for a list of interviewees, questions and detailed responses. 
4 See page 9 for the methodology and Appendix V for a detailed discussion of some data issues 
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RESEARCH 
 
Foreclosures and Fraud in North Minneapolis 
 
One charge to this project was to find ways for residents and neighborhoods to 
identify activities that might warn of predatory investing. We conclude that there are 
no new warning signs.  There are many organizations that have produced good 
materials describing predatory lending techniques and other schemes including 
varieties of predatory investment.  We do not believe we should spend any time or 
resources on duplicating these efforts.   
 
The initial phase of interviews identified many problems contributing to the wave of 
foreclosures in North Minneapolis.5  Most of these were made possible by the 
combination of rapidly rising home values and drastically lowered underwriting 
standards for mortgage products.  We were unable to identify specific practices by 
property buyers that contributed directly to large numbers of foreclosures.  We 
conclude that there are already many resources that warn homeowners and 
prospective buyers about the various predatory lending practices and investment 
scams observed in North Minneapolis.  Recent state legislation has also outlawed 
some of these practices.   
 
We took from the interviews a sense that the next period of rising home values may 
well bring a repeat of these problems.  Public education seems to be the best 
strategy for neighborhoods, local governments and community organizations to 
address this issue. Other policy measures could reduce inflated appraisals and 
increase the transparency of mortgage transactions to allow better monitoring (see 
below). 
 
Policy Recommendations: Reducing Predatory Lending & Fraud  
 
1. Require that the names of the appraiser, the individual mortgage broker, 
the institutional originator, and the title company involved in a 
residential mortgage be part of the public record, filed with the other 
public documents. 
2. At such time as a rising market provides opportunities for a resurgence 
of predatory lending, use existing educational materials produced by 
various sources to conduct a public education campaign aimed at home 
buyers and owners who may be targets of predatory lending practices in 
the future.  Increase the reach and effectiveness of this campaign by 
working with trusted intermediary organizations such as churches, 
social service agencies and neighborhood organizations. 
                                                 
5 See Appendix I & II for the list of persons interviewed and a list of interview questions.  A description of the 
predatory and fraudulent practices identified. is in Appendix III  
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Crime and Foreclosure 
 
There is a perception that foreclosures may be linked to crime in our neighborhoods.  
One recent TV story appeared to link foreclosures and homicides6.  Official statistics 
show that despite the huge increase in foreclosures over the past year, the number of 
homicides through July in 2007 (26) is close to the 2006 number (25).  Part I crimes 
(violent) were down from about 8,800 through April 2006 to 7,900 (-10%) in 2007. 
The chart below shows the relationship between foreclosures and homicides in 
Minneapolis over the past 8 years.  The numbers of violent crimes in the past 2 years 
of massive foreclosures are substantially below the numbers in the mid-1990’s.  The 
number of homicides is also much lower than in the “Murderapolis” years (1995-96). 
 
Foreclosures, Homicides and Part I Crimes7 in Minneapolis & Hennepin 
County, 1994-2007 
 
Year Foreclosures8 Homicides  Part I Crimes 
 Minneapolis Hennepin Co. Minneapolis Hennepin  Co. Minneapolis 
2006 1,610  3,042 57 67 29,169
2005 843  1,681 47 58 28,110
2004 N/A 1,223 53 59 25,207
2003 N/A 1,058 46 56 25,171
2002 N/A 834 47 63 26,891
2001 N/A 640 43 53 27,079
2000 N/A 593 50 58 27,750
1999 N/A 573 47 53 31,029
1996 N/A N/A 83 N/A 41,319
1995 N/A N/A 97 N/A 41,739
1994 N/A N/A 62 N/A 41,855
 
 
While we find no link between homicides and foreclosures, most studies agree that 
foreclosures can create conditions that promote crime.  Vacant buildings are often 
tempting sites for vandalism and illicit activity, and foreclosures result in many 
vacancies. A loss of neighbors can lead to “blind spots” in a community where there 
are fewer eyes to notice and report suspicious activities.   
 
While there is clearly a link between poverty and foreclosures (because sub-prime 
loans were targeted to low income, minority communities) and a link between poverty 
and crime, we see no independent link between crime, homicides and foreclosures.  
Future detailed studies may reveal other patterns. 
                                                 
6 KARE11 report  “North Minneapolis: Hope for the Future” aired 7/10/2007 
7 Type I Crimes include homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft and 
arson.  All crime data from MN BCA annual crime reports on their website as of 8/13/07 (1994-2004) and 
Minneapolis Police Department website as of 8/13/07 (2005-07) 
8 Data from CURA (2005, 2006) and Hennepin County Sheriff’s office (1999-2004) 
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The Shift from Homestead to Non-Homestead Status 
 
When a property goes through foreclosure, there are four possible outcomes 
regarding its designation as homestead or non-homestead: 
 
  Previous Status       Foreclosure  Current Status 
Loss  Homestead→→→→→→→→  →→→→→→  Non-homestead  
No Change Homestead→→→→→→→→  →→→→→→  Homestead 
No Change Non-homestead →→→→→→  →→→→→→ Non-homestead 
Gain  Non-homestead →→→→→→  →→→→→→ Homestead 
 
We are most concerned about the losses, properties which convert from 
homesteaded to non-homestead, because we are concerned about preserving 
homeownership for the current residents of North Minneapolis.  The no change 
outcomes occur most frequently.  Gains are quite rare, with just 20 properties in 2005 
(out of 480 foreclosures) and nine properties in the first nine months of 2006 (out of 
626 foreclosures)9 going from non-homestead to homestead.   
 
The Number of Losses in North Minneapolis 
 
In 2005, 32% of all parcels in North Minneapolis were non-homestead properties 
(6,415).  In 2007, that increased to 38% (7,558).  This gives us a 6 percentage point 
increase in non-homestead properties (about 1,143 units) regardless of foreclosure 
status. 
 
Increase in Non-Homestead Status 
All North Minneapolis Properties 
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9 We have contacted the current homeowners of those properties to request interviews to find out what positive 
factors persuaded them to choose a previously foreclosed home.   
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2005 Foreclosures 
 
For the 487 North Minneapolis properties that went through foreclosure in 2005, the 
increase in non-homestead designated properties is significant.  Forty seven percent 
(47%) of those properties (227) were non-homestead at the point of foreclosure.  
Looking at the designation of those properties in 2007 reveals that 72% of them (347) 
are now non-homestead.   
 
  
        2005 Foreclosed Properties   
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006 Foreclosures 
 
From January through September of 200610, there were 626 foreclosures in North 
Minneapolis.  Of these, 43% (270 properties) were non-homestead at the time of 
foreclosure.  In 2007, 64% (402) of the January-September 2006 foreclosed 
properties are now non-homestead.   
 
      2006 Foreclosed Properties   2006 Foreclosed Properties 
tus in 2006     Homestead Status in 2007 
 
 
 
    2005 Foreclosed Properties
 Homestead Status in 2007           Homestead Status in 2005  
28%
72%
Non-
Homestead
Homestead
Non-
Homestead
53% 47% Homestead
        Homestead Sta
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 We chose to examine foreclosures from January-September of 2006 because the two sets of parcel data we had 
access to were dated April and May of 2007, meaning that foreclosures from the last three months of 2006 would 
still be in their redemption period in our data.  We are interested in knowing the final outcome of the foreclosure, 
after the redemption period, so we could only look at the first nine months of 2006. 
 
43%57%
Non-
Homestead
Homestead
64%
36%
Non-
Homestead
Homestead
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Role of Foreclosures in Overall Trend 
 
The 2005 foreclosed properties that have 
homestead status account for 10.5% of 
homestead properties from
for 11.5%. 
 
Loss in Homestead Status Number 
converted from homestead to non-
the total increase in North Minneapolis non-
 2005-2007, while the 2006 foreclosed properties account 
Percent of Total Losses 
2005 Foreclosed Properties 
 
120 10.5% 
2006 Foreclosed Properties 
 
132 11.5% 
All 2005-2006 Foreclosed 
roper
252 22% 
P ties 
Total North Minneapolis 
Losses 2005-2007 
1,143 100% 
 
This gives a total of 252 conversions from homestead to non-homestead among the 
reclosed properties so that 22% of the total change from 2005 to 2007 was due to 
reclosures.  Given that 1,200 foreclosures are projected to occur in 2007, there 
ould be as many as another 260 properties that are homestead losses as a result of 
reclosure in the next year. 
osses in the Rest of Minneapolis  
rease 
apolis (6%) is double the increase for the remainder of the city (3%).  
 
 Non-H stead Status
All Minneapolis Properties Outside North Minneapolis 
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fo
c
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L
 
For comparison we examined trends in homestead status changes for the rest of 
Minneapolis.  We found that outside of North Minneapolis there was a 3% inc
from 24% non-homestead properties in 2005 to 27% non-homestead properties in 
2007.  Thus, the amount of conversion from homestead to non-homestead status in 
North Minne
 
Increase in ome  
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Change in Homestead Status in North Minneapolis and Other City Areas 
005-2006 2
 
 
  2005 
 
2007 
Non-Homestead 6,415 32%
 
7,558 38%
Homestead 13,498 68% 12,342 62%
 
  
North Minneapolis 
 
19,900 100%Total 19,913 100%
Non-Homestead 20,336 24%
 
22,671 27%
Homestead 62,685 76%
 
60,308 73%
 
Outside North 
Minneapolis  
Total 83,021 100%
 
82,979 100%
Non-Homestead 26,751 26%
 
30,229 29%
Homestead 76,183 74%
 
72,650 71%
 
All Minneapolis 
Total 102,934 100%
 
102,879 100%
 
 
an increas
 
The actual incre s 1,143, so 
is means we .  The 252 
reclosed properties that converted in 2005 - 6 account for 42% of the extra increase 
 North Minneapolis.   
North Minneapolis Increase in  
Non-Homestead Property 2005-2007 
 
 
 
 
One way of looking at this is to assume that a 3% increase in non-homestead 
properties in North Minneapolis could be expected, because that is the trend in the 
rest of Minneapolis.  To have a three percentage point increase in non-homestead 
property in North Minneapolis from 2005-2007, from 32% to 35%, would have meant 
e of 550 non-homestead properties.   
ase in non-homestead properties from 2005 to 2007 wa
are dealing with an additional increase of 593 propertiesth
fo
in
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341
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Extra
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Foreclosures 
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 Number of Percent Percent 
Properties 
changing to 
Non-
Homest
of Total 
Increase
of Extra 
Increase 
 
ead 
Expected increase of 3% 550 48% NA 
2005-2006 Foreclosed 
os
252 22% 42% 
Properties- L ses 
Additional Increase in Non-
Homestead Properties 
341 30%  58%
Total Increase 1,14  3 100% NA 
 
 
We suspect that much o ing port he ex cre orth
Minneapolis (341 properties) may reflect the discouraging impac
foreclosures on current h wners who lo fiden the nity ish 
 sell quickly so they may leave the area.   
For this reason, we believe that the Northside’s significant increase in non-
homestead property, two ter than st of t ty, c ostl
attributed to the direct and indirect impact of foreclosures.  Decisive public policy 
hanges and actions to p ve ownership and stabiliz
ecessary to interrupt this negative feedback process. 
f the remain ion of t tra in ase in N
t of concentrated 
 
omeo se con ce in  commu  and w
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POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: H
s and 
out all of these
elpi e
Strengthening Communities 
 
Foreclosures impact individuals, familie communities, and the orthside 
Neighborhood Alliance is concerned ab  impacts.  We know that a 
variety o to a s all of thes r-related concerns. 
 
Helping
Preserving homeownership and limiting the number of in r-own perties is a 
primary g ighborhood Alliance (NNA).  Additionally, NNA seeks 
to maintain the traditionally high level of  America  ow hip on the 
orthside.  The NNA believes that people who lose their homes to foreclosure should 
ave the chance to become homeowners again if this is financially feasible.  Only 
rough 
s 
reserving home ownership has many components, and foreclosure prevention 
 
 
 of 
 
e households who 
articipated in the program were still current on their mortgages (i.e. not in 
foreclosure) both one year and three years after receiving counseling.  However, the 
Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention Program can barely keep up with the demand for 
their services now, and if foreclosures continue to grow exponentially they will be 
seriously understaffed. 
 
Action is already under way to increase foreclosure prevention counseling.  Although 
the state was unable to fully fund the Homeownership Education, Counseling and 
Training Fund (HECAT) program which supports foreclosure prevention efforts, some 
additional resources for counseling on the Northside are in place.  More support is 
needed on an ongoing basis, and even more will be necessary if foreclosure rates 
continue to rise as projected.  There is a particular need for counselors who speak 
Hmong and Lao to assist members of those communities in North Minneapolis.  
Organizations serving those communities report that they have been unable to 
connect homeowners to counselors fluent in those languages. 
 
Families in foreclosure whose financial situation allows may be able to stay in their 
homes, either obtaining a loan modification from their current mortgage lender or by 
repurchasing the property with a new mortgage before the end of the redemption 
period.  These options are only available if the family is able to demonstrate that their 
delinquency was due to a one-time hardship or qualify for a new loan in an amount 
                                                
ng Famili s and 
 N
f measures will be needed ddres e inte
 Families 
vesto ed pro
oal of the Northside Ne
 African n home ners
N
h
after pursuing all opportunities for current residents, people who have gone th
foreclosure or families who currently rent on the Northside, to become homeowner
would we consider attracting new homeowners from outside the community. 
 
P
counseling is one of the most important.  The current Mortgage Foreclosure
Prevention Program that the Northside Residents’ Redevelopment Council and
Habitat for Humanity operate in Minneapolis prevented 579 foreclosures from July
2000 to June of 2003, out of 1,586 households who received intensive counseling
services11.  This program is effective because 60% of th
p
 
11 Quercia, Roberto G. et al.  “The Cost-Effectiveness of Community-Based Foreclosure Prevention.”  
Research paper for the Family Housing Fund.  December 2005. 
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equal or greater than the amount of their mortgage that is in foreclosure.  E
suggests that while some mortg
vidence 
age holders are willing to negotiate, others will not do 
o.  The lenders and investors who hold mortgages of families who are behind on 
 
ss 
ion 
ouncil but obstacles remain. 
a 
 
pacts of foreclosures on owners and tenants alike.   
acter 
d 
r criminal 
 
h educational and outreach campaigns. Second, we must 
duce the amount of time that properties stand vacant.  Third, we must work to 
sed institutions 
should make every effort to utilize block clubs, congregations and other 
s
their payments need to make loan modifications and other work-out tools more
available to those families that have enough income to afford their home.   Progre
is being made on this front through the efforts of the Foreclosure Funders Prevent
C
 
Families displaced by foreclosure, whether owners or tenants, need assistance 
finding temporary and transitional housing.  Those homeowners who experience 
foreclosure need assistance in repairing their credit scores and dealing with other 
financial burdens.  They may need financial literacy training and/or temporary cash to 
cover daily expenses.  Children need assistance remaining in school and avoiding 
gap in their educations if the family is forced to move. 
 
In short, there is a need for a comprehensive coordinated effort to address the
im
 
Strengthening Communities: Preserving Neighborhood Stability & Char
 
Our North Minneapolis communities also face negative impacts from the wave of 
foreclosures. Home values are dropping quickly, long-time residents are being force
to move away from the neighborhoods and vacant buildings offer venues fo
activity.  Dealing with the concentration of foreclosed properties is crucial to
preserving the value and livability of these 13 neighborhoods.   
 
Again there are a series of related efforts that are required.  First we must work to 
prevent foreclosures wit
re
preserve or increase the percentage of owner occupied homes and work to keep 
families in their neighborhoods to preserve the connection and relationships that 
create community.  There are various options for each of these efforts. 
 
Policy Recommendations: Reduce Foreclosures by Helping Families & 
Strengthening Communities 
 
1. Publicize the availability of foreclosure prevention counseling widely 
a. Neighborhood organizations and other community ba
associations to provide homeowners and tenants with crucial information 
about foreclosure prevention, counseling resources and warning signs of 
predatory lending. 
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b.  
2. Expand foreclosure prevention counseling services 
a. The foreclosure prevention counselors that currently serve North 
Minneapolis need more funding so they can add staff to meet increasi
demand (a projected increase of 1,200 foreclosures in 2008).  Counselors 
should be located in North Minneapolis to increase ease of access to those 
affected. 
ng 
b. Funds should be provided to hire  trained staff fluent in the appropriate 
 
 
ailable to them, and they need 
to know that a sheriff’s sale does not automatically mean they have to 
ncies and other sources. 
b. An overall goal of these efforts should be to stop houses from becoming 
 
long as possible while it is going through foreclosure will prevent it from 
 
with a greater impact 
than the I-35W bridge collapse.  These families need services including finding 
.  
d 
een 
closure 
proceedings for three months to allow community organizations time to 
le 
.  The goal would be to work out alternate repayment 
or refinancing plans so that eligible homeowners could remain in their 
e as 
b. 
 
 
 
 
languages to address foreclosure issues in the Hmong, Lao and other
immigrant communities. 
3. For families that rent properties in foreclosure, information about renter’s
rights should be made available and they should be informed of resources 
that can assist them in finding alternate housing. 
a. Renters need to know what resources are av
move out.  They should receive information about services available 
through community organizations, public age
boarded and vacant.  Keeping tenants in the house they are renting for as
becoming boarded and vacant.  The less time a house has been vacant
the more likely it is to be in decent shape for repurchase by a homeowner. 
4. Convene service providers to develop coordinated methods for providing 
comprehensive housing services to families losing their homes.   
Having over 2,000 families lose their homes is a disaster 
new housing and alternatives to homelessness or leaving the neighborhood
Options could include providing links to responsible local landlords who nee
good tenants. 
5. Voluntary moratorium on foreclosures 
a. A three-month, voluntary, foreclosure moratorium on foreclosures has b
proposed.  Each mortgage holder could choose to cease fore
work with homeowners who are either in foreclosure or having troub
paying their mortgage
homes if possible and mortgage holders would recover as much valu
possible from their properties. 
Encouraging all lenders to participate would increase the reach and 
effectiveness of the moratorium and exert the pressure of public opinion on
individual mortgage holding firms. 
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CONCLUSION – Quick Reactions, Long Term Plans 
 
We call fo
comprehe
 
In the midst of this extremely difficult and complex situation, there are nonetheless 
opport
have for th
properties are so badly damaged by the elements or vandalism that they should be 
e 
No
Min h our research would be to 
require
Minneapo
future, and
developm ake 
place a d 
policy mak
best intere
 
The North
 a 
clo  
relation
drawba
contro  
land tr   
NNA can develop and promote a comprehensive approach to promoting community 
g by encouraging the use of local 
contra
and rehab
 
After craft
Home Fun
 
r a discussion involving NNA member organizations to develop a 
nsive housing and redevelopment strategy for North Minneapolis. 
unities that can be identified by listening to the vision community members 
e future of North Minneapolis.  It is estimated that large numbers of 
razed and replaced.  While it is tragic to lose many of the classic housing units on th
rthside, there is also an opportunity to look at the future of housing in North 
neapolis.  One element of this vision we heard throug
 that all rehabilitation and new construction that takes place in North 
lis be environmentally-friendly.  Green construction is the wave of the 
 North Minneapolis could be on the cutting edge of this new type of 
ent.  Significant changes in the Northside’s housing stock are going to t
s a result of the foreclosure epidemic.   It will be up to Northside residents an
ers to make sure that these changes are planned and designed with the 
sts of the community in mind.   
side Neighborhood Alliance can play a proactive role in charting the future 
of hosing and economic development on the Northside by convening a body to take
se look at the opportunities available.  The discussion would include the
ship between housing and economic development, the benefits and 
cks of increasing housing density, the potential for community ownership and 
l of sites or buildings and other issues.  Options such as housing cooperatives,
usts and community development corporations should be carefully considered.
wealth as part of the redevelopment of housin
ctors and labor, training of local residents for the work required to redevelop 
ilitate housing and other strategies.  
ing a picture of redevelopment, NNA needs to work with the Northside 
d Board, the city and others to implement these ideas.  
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Appendix I 
 
Interviews Conducted 
2. Joel Larson, HousingLink 
ber 
ily 
sident 
14. Darlynn Benjamin, Deputy District Director, Congressman Keith Ellison’s office 
25. Wendy Walker, Appraiser 
 
1. Michael Grover, Federal Reserve Bank, Community Affairs department 
3. Melissa Manderscheid, Attorney, working with Foreclosure Prevention 
Funders Council 
4. Karen Reid, NeDA (Neighborhood Development Alliance), St. Paul 
5. Jeff Matson, Center for Urban and Regional Affairs 
6. Anne McCandless, Jordan resident and Advisory Committee member 
7. Jeff Skrenes, Hawthorne Housing Director and Advisory Committee mem
8. Amanda Rohrer, former Research Assistant for NeDA 
9. Juli Leerssen and Aaron Ash, Jordan New Life Church One-Stop Fam
Support Center 
10. Brandon Nessen, ACORN 
11. State Representative Willie Dominguez 
12. Nelima Sitati, Harrison Housing Organizer and Advisory Committee member, 
and Lisa Fairibault, Realtor 
13. Deb Wagner, Realtor and Jordan re
15. Prentiss Cox, U of MN Law Professor 
16. Georgianna Yantos, Hawthorne homeowner and Advisory Committee member 
17. Greg Corradini, NeDA Research Assistant 
18. State Senator Linda Higgins 
19. City Council President Barb Johnson 
20. Karen Johnson, Northside Residents Redevelopment Council foreclosure 
counselor 
21. Leah Weaver, Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis 
22. Rosi Nieto, Realtor and Jordan resident 
23. Representative Joe Mullery 
24. Anonymous Residential Appraiser 
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Appendix II 
 
Interview Questions 
 
1. What practices have you seen investors or landlords engage in that have been 
polis neighborhoods? 
s, people or properties? 
residents 
  In 
mend that I speak to about this problem?  Who 
es? 
 
 
damaging to North Minnea
2. Are you aware of any specific examples of this in your neighborhood?  
Specific companie
3. What kinds of damage does this do to the neighborhood?  How are 
being hurt by this? 
4. How extensive do you think these problems are in your neighborhood?
North 
Minneapolis? 
5. Have you and your neighbors done anything about this?  What has been 
done? 
6. Who else would you recom
would know more about specific properti
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Appendix III 
 
Other Predatory Investing Co
The
“preda  sold an inappropriate 
mo In 
contra which investors buying property 
hav
practices or schemes which are illegal or unethical and which result in harm to the 
com ns.  
First, predatory investing often results in inflated home prices and assessments.  This 
makes it harder for homeowners to sell their properties and increases their tax 
liab  
deals, not in managing properties.  This often results in properties being run down, 
aba to 
“bad” t rther depressing property values.  
vestors concerned only with profiting from a deal may increase the number of 
roperties going into foreclosure, thus depressing the housing market and harming 
the investments of homeowners committed to the neighborhood.  Finally, the 
increase in the number of absentee landlords and property owners, combined with a 
proliferation of foreclosed, abandoned or neglected properties can increase the 
emotional disinvestment of other residents. Both homeowners and tenants may fall 
into despair, feeling desperate to leave the neighborhood and uninterested in 
investing the energy needed to maintain or improve social relations within the 
community. 
 
Because a variety of activities were originally described as “predatory investment” 
issues, the first step of the project was to ask those involved to define and give 
examples of such practices that were hurting Northside communities. At this point, 
Erickson has conducted 25 interviews. The interviewees and the questions asked are 
provided below.  The purpose of the interviews was to identify predatory investing 
practices and establish an understanding of the role investors play in the growing 
rate of foreclosures and how that affects communities on the Northside.   The 
interview subjects identified the following practices which are described along with 
comments about the implications for further research. 
 
• Equity stripping 
o The “foreclosure rescue” scam, in which a homeowner facing foreclosure is 
approached by a scammer who says they can save the person’s home.  
The scammer convinces the homeowner to deed the home to them and 
promises to let the homeowner rent their home and sell it back to them, but 
they eventually raise the rent beyond what the former homeowner can 
afford and evict them.  Note: previous research had defined equity stripping 
ncerns 
 
 phrase “predatory investing” was used to distinguish these activities from 
tory lending”, in which an individual home buyer is
rtgage, due to illegal or unethical actions by the mortgage lender or broker. 
st, predatory investing refers to the ways in 
e taken advantage of the inflated housing market to make money through 
munity.  Predatory investing is a concern to the communities for several reaso
ilities. Second, predatory investors are interested in getting money out of their
ndoned or foreclosed.  In some cases, absentee owners are perceived to rent 
enants and/or may neglect their properties, fu
In
p
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much more broadly as lan  not maintain their property.12  
Based on our interviews, the narrower definition above is the one in 
his is a variant of “predatory lending” 
because the individual home owner is the target. 
rs ago 
t 
st 
 
 their 
ace 
tor 
 
re it 
tors 
nsaction. 
 The missing escrow 
 
d by people involved in the 
company.  The buyer may be promised cash back at the closing and told 
e from the company will manage the properties for them.  
 
                                                
dlords who do
common use.  In some ways t
o This practice is not new and it is well understood because a few yea
the Attorney General’s office took up several cases against the larges
perpetrators of this scam.  As of 2004, Minnesota has one of the toughe
laws in the country against equity stripping, and lawyers who work in this
field think it is working well. 
o The Volunteer Lawyers Network and Legal Aid co-chair the Equity 
Stripping Task Force and they assign lawyers to all the equity stripping 
cases that they are aware of.  However, since home prices have declined 
so significantly, the people who call them now have very little equity in
homes- in fact, most of their calls now are people who are upside down, 
that is, their mortgage is worth more than their house is.        
• One transaction flip 
o This is a variation on flipping (buying a house cheaply and then selling 
quickly at an inflated price to an unsuspecting buyer).  The flip takes pl
in one transaction done with an inflated appraisal, and the potential 
cooperation of many parties.  This scheme generally involves a real
acting as a dual agent for both the buyer and the seller.  The realtor inflates
the price the buyer pays and takes the extra profit. They may then sha
with other parties involved like the appraiser and the title company and 
often the buyer as well.  Some interviews reported hearing that inves
were “getting cash out of a mortgage” and that may refer to such a 
tra
•
o This is a predatory lending problem (not predatory investing) in which a 
homeowner was told that their mortgage payment included an escrow
(property taxes and insurance) when it didn’t.  The lender may suddenly 
increase the payment to cover property taxes, triggering foreclosure 
proceedings. 
• Straw buyer schemes 
o As described in the Star Tribune article, brokerage companies take 
advantage of people who want to invest in real estate by selling them 
properties at inflated values, properties owne
that someon
Instead the properties are neglected and no active management is done.  
The end buyer is responsible for an inflated mortgage and often is unable
to meet the payments. Sometimes this includes the “management 
company” taking the rents but failing to pay on the mortgage.  The result is 
often a vacant and/or foreclosed property. 
 
12 Rohrer, Amanda.  “Residential Investment Activities in West Side Saint Paul.”  Research paper for 
Neighborhood Development Alliance.  February 2007. 
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o  
• Inflate
ls 
 and foreclosed.  The inflated appraisal price 
nd 
o 
• Gettin
 investors are getting large sums of money out of 
ey 
 
  
. 
o 
Warni  
The Commerce Department and other groups are actively investigating
cases where groups of investors engaged in some variation on this 
scheme possibly also involving inflated appraisals. 
d appraisals 
o Houses are appraised at artificially high values that do not reflect the 
declining value of homes in North Minneapolis.  These inflated appraisa
are used to get mortgages well above the value of the property and the 
investor often pockets cash.  The property is then priced too high to sell 
and may end up abandoned
may also hurt other property owners through higher assessments a
taxes. 
This is difficult to track because appraisals are not public documents.  
Inflated appraisals play a role in several of these other practices such as 
flipping and straw buyers. 
g cash out of a mortgage at closing 
o We are told that
mortgages.  They may take that money and abandon the property, or th
may rent out the property and collect the rent but never pay on the 
mortgage.  This may be done in conjunction with inflated appraisals.
Refinancing for cash is common and not inherently illegal or fraudulent.
While the landlord may subsequently neglect their property, this is always a 
potential problem and is not tied to mortgage fraud.  Existing regulations 
and laws addressing “problem landlords” can be enforced in such cases
Some instances of investors “getting cash out” may refer to a one 
transaction flip (see above).. 
 
 
ng Signs 
e to this project was to find ways for residents and neighborhoods to 
tivities that might warn of predatory investing. We conclude that we th
 
One charg
identify ac ere 
are no new warning signs.  There are many organizations that have produced good 
ry lending techniques and other schemes including 
varietie o ime or 
resour es
 
We recom
communi
communi
don’t learn
related fra s 
sharing w
congregat  valuable in preventing future 
frauds. 
materials describing predato
s f predatory investment.  We do not believe we should spend any t
c  on duplicating these efforts. 
mend instead that Northside neighborhood organizations and other 
ty agencies work to educate the homeowners and renters in the 
ty using these existing materials. Many homeowners don’t receive or 
 the crucial information they need to avoid becoming victims of mortgage 
uds and schemes.  Outreach efforts that involve individual neighbor
ith one another through existing ties such as block clubs, religious 
ions or other connections can be extremely
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Curren  Pt redatory Investment Dangers 
 
ious investment practices described above, we feel that 
several w
pressi  
and possi er 
investigati t.  
The missi  
 
We conclude that the remaining issue of concern that underlies several of 
these 
easier  p
straw buyer schemes or to enable the purchaser to receive cash out of the 
sent for this activity, it remains a 
proble h lution is 
a publi
policy reco
 
Policy rec  
real estat
• Requir
compa  
the h
o  tracking patterns of possible fraud. 
• To reduce the likelihood of inflated appraisals, pass legislation similar to the Ohio 
law prohibiting lenders and brokers from pressuring appraisers to achieve certain 
 
o 90% of appraisers surveyed for the 2007 National Appraisal Survey said 
ers 
s.  According to the 2007 National 
Appraisal Survey, 68% of those appraisers who refused to modify a 
 to 
he 
r greed.  The results for the community are uniformly bad – properties whose 
conditions deteriorate and buildings that are abandoned or foreclosed.  These 
properties reduce the value of those around them and the sheer number in North 
After reviewing the var
ere symptoms of the inflated housing market and are no longer 
ng issues, due to the slump in home prices.  This includes equity stripping 
bly one transaction flipping.  The straw buyer scheme appears to be und
on by others including the FBI and the Minnesota Commerce Departmen
ng escrow situation is a predatory lending issue, not an investment issue.  
investment schemes is inflated appraisals.  During a rising market it is 
to roduce an inflated appraisal of a property which can be used in “flipping”, 
transaction.  While there is less opportunity at pre
m t at could return if and when markets heat up again.  A potential so
c policy response that would reduce pressure for inflated appraisals. Several 
mmendations are made below. 
ommendations to increase transparency in public records involving
e transactions 
e that the names of the appraiser, the mortgage originator, and the title 
ny involved in a residential mortgage be part of the public record, filed with
 ot er public documents. 
 This might aid investigators in
stated values.
that they felt uncomfortable pressure from lenders to adjust property 
valuations, while in the same survey in 2003, 55% of appraisers felt this 
pressure. 
o Appraisers are vulnerable to pressure from mortgage brokers and lend
because they face a reduction in business if a certain broker or lender 
discontinues utilizing their service
property valuation to the lender or broker’s liking lost that office or 
individual as a client.  45% of appraisers who refused to change their 
valuation did not get paid for that appraisal. 
 
Finally, some of the housing issues facing North Minneapolis now are connected
investors who own property that they cannot or will not maintain or pay off.  T
reasons for this behavior may vary from incompetence to bad timing, lack of liquid 
assets o
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Minneapolis depresses sales and property values. In addition, it is possible that 
lies may be purchased by investors and 
ecome rental properties.  Many investor properties that go into foreclosure are 
til 
homes previously owned by individual fami
b
occupied by tenants who have been paying their rent and did not know that the 
building was being foreclosed.  Although these tenants have the right to stay un
their lease ends, many are being evicted. 
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Appendix IV 
 
Analysis of Investor Foreclosures 
 
We sorted the list of all Northside foreclosures and pulled out the names that 
occurred multiple times. 
 
Of the 1,990 properties that have been foreclosed from 2005 to May of 2007: 
• 361 (about 18%) were owned by investors (defined as people who own at 
least three foreclosed properties) 
o 85 investors owned three or more foreclosed properties 
• The largest number of properties owned by a single investor is 11  
• The majority of these investors (43) own exactly three properties-   
• Another 260 properties (about 13%) were owned by people who own two 
foreclosed properties- 130 people own two foreclosed properties 
• Overall, we identified just under 1/3 of foreclosed properties as being owned 
by investors (defined as individuals who own 2 or more foreclosed properties). 
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 anges in Owner Occupancy 
 
 either 
tead to identify properties that may be investor owned.  We 
sed homestead designations as listed in the Hennepin County parcel data, which 
s 
Ce r  
design
data file w  the initial 
cla f s 
(co e  
(ho e 
accura ata.  For the 
gai a  
prop r
esign
on-homestead status.  This includes the owner’s name (individual or corporate) or 
ense for a single family building.  
 
Results of Reviewing the Accuracy of 
and 2006 Foreclosures 
 
 Homestead 
Status 
Classification 
Total 
Properties 
Checked 
Errors Error 
Percentage 
Appendix V 
 
Note on Methodology: Tracking Ch
For this research, we used the Hennepin County designations of a property as
homestead or non-homes
u
we obtained from MetroGIS with the assistance of the University of Minnesota’
nte  for Urban and Regional Affairs (CURA).  We are, however, aware that this
ation may not be completely up to date for each property because the parcel 
as drawn from April 2007. In order to check the accuracy of 
ssi ications we took a random sample of 20 properties from both the los
nv rsion from homestead to non-homestead) and no change categories
mestead to homestead or non-homestead to non-homestead) and checked th
cy of the 2007 designation against the most recent online parcel d
n c tegory (conversion from non-homestead to homestead), we checked all of the
e ties because there were so few.  In addition to looking at the property tax 
ation in July 2007, we also looked for additional evidence that would suggest a d
n
the existence of a current rental lic
Changes in Homestead Status for 2005 
2005 
Foreclosures 
    
 Loss 20 of 139 (14%) 2 10% 
 Gain 24 4 16.7%   
 No change 20 of 303 (7%) 2 10% 
2006 
Foreclosures 
    
 Loss 20 of 148 
(13.5%) 
0 0% 
 Gain 16 7 43.8% 
 No change 20 of 453 
(4.4%) 
4 20% 
Combined 
Foreclosures 
    
 Loss 40 of 287 (14%) 2 5% 
 Gain 40 11 27.5% 
 No change 40 of 756 
(5.3%) 
6 15% 
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005 Foreclosed Properties 2
Loss of Homestead Status: 2 errors out of the 20 properties sampled.  In both cases, 
our April data file lists the properties as non-homestead, but the most recent online 
Hennepin County parcel information file lists both the properties as homestead. 
These 2 properties should have been counted as no change.  This is a 10% error 
rate. 
 
Gain in Homestead Status: Out of the 24 properties that were identified as gains 
(converted from non-homestead to homestead), there appear to be 2 errors.  Both o
these properties were listed as non-homestead in the online Hennepin County pa
data file although they are identified as homestead in the April data file.  They
have been in the no change category.  Additionally, there are two properties 
we have reason to believe are not owner-occupied; one property because it is a 
single family home with an active rental license, and the other because it is boarded.  
With four total errors we have a 16.7% error rate. 
 
f 
rcel 
 should 
which 
No change in Homestead Status: There were 2 errors out of the 20 properties 
sampled.  Both of those properties were categorized as homestead in 2005 and 
homestead in 2007 based on the April property data, but upon closer examination 
ey are listed as non-homestead in 2007 in the current Hennepin County online 
p
 
006 Foreclosed Properties 
oss of Homestead S
th
arcel data file.  They are actually losses.  This is a 10% error rate. 
2
L tatus: There were rs in the 20  p es in this 
category. 
 
 Homestead S tus
no erro  sampled roperti
Gain in ta : We found 2 errors out of the 16 properties that registered 
e 2 properties are currently listed in Hennepin County’s online parcel 
ata as non-homeste 2007, mean o ains.  T hould be 
ounted as no chang  found 4 pro s that are listed in the online file as 
wned by a lender, a rty th ily me with ctive rental 
es are not owner ccupied nd thus not 
, even though they are listed as homestead in both parcel data sets. 
as gains.  Thes
d ad for ing that they are n t g hey s
c e.  We pertie
o nd one prope at is a single fam  ho  an a
license.  Thus, these additional 5 proper
truly homestead
ti -o a
 
No change in Homestead Status: There were 4 errors out of the 20 properties 
ampled.  One of the rs was a property described by the April data as non-
omestead in 2006 a stead en it was recorded as homestead 
 the Hennepin Coun e par se.  The her 3 we tegorized 
d to hom stead by the Apr
007 a cording to the cur ent Hennepin County online data.  This 
 are a  losses. 
s se erro
h
in
nd non-home
ty 2007 onlin
 in 2007 wh
cel databa
property data, when they actually are non-
 ot re ca
as homestea
homestead in 2
eans that they
e
c
il 
r
m ctually
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Analysis 
hese errors reveal that the classifications based on the April 2007 data are under-
f homestead status properties and over-counting 
d to 
r 
e are estimating.   
s 
 significant for our research 
ecause we were not concerned with analyzing that trend. 
 
 
T
counting no change and loss o
gains.  For our research, the most significant implication of these errors is the under-
counting of losses of homestead status.  Thus, all the conclusions we are drawing 
about the losses and how much they account for the overall shift from homestea
non-homestead properties are under-stated.  The actual losses may well be greate
than w
 
The over-counting of gains using the April data occurred primarily for the propertie
foreclosed in 2006 data.  We feel that the reason for this is the short amount of time 
between 2006 foreclosures and July 2007, when this research was done.  This short 
amount of time means that these records are more likely to be out-of-date because 
foreclosure sales and corresponding changes in homestead status may not have 
been recorded yet.      
 
The under-counting of no change properties is not
b
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